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I. INTRODUCTION
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and decency. . . . The common law has always
recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even
to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands.
Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted
authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient
curiosity?'
More than a century ago, two legal scholars called for more privacy in the
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv 193, 196 (1890).
Brandeis went on to become a United States Supreme Court Justice.
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home from the overbearing glare of the press. 2 In 1999, the United States Supreme
Court, in Wilson v. Layne,3 drew a bright line at the front door to keep the media
out. The Court's ruling in Wilson was not designed to hamper the press, but instead
was grounded in the protection of privacy in the home.4 Thus, the Court has made it
a violation of the Fourth Amendment for the police to bring the press inside a home
while executing a warrant.5 This does not, however, stop all the so-called media
ride-along programs (where the police allow reporters and photographers to
accompany police officers on patrol and photograph or videotape them in action).6
Consequently, the Court issued a narrow ruling, holding only that police cannot
bring the press inside a home when executing a warrant.
7
Although the facts of Wilson tell us media presence in the home is a
violation when members of the press are physically present inside the house,8 a
companion case, Hanlon v. Berger,9 is not so plain regarding where members of the
press have to be before a Fourth Amendment violation will occur. In Hanlon, no
members of the press were actually inside the home, but were instead present on
the curtilage of the home.10 A recording device (microphone) belonging to the press
was attached to a federal agent who entered the home, but the home was not subject
to the search warrant.11 The Court in Hanlon repeated its holding in Wilson and left
several questions open for later discussion.
Although the rulings are not generally welcome ones for the press, 12 they
2 See id.
526 U.S. 603 (1999).
4 See id. at 613 (holding that the First Amendment is important, but the Fourth Amendment
protection of privacy is more important when the media is an uninvited visitor in the home during police
action).
See id at 614.
6 See Benjamin Svetkey, Running Shotgun - Filming of the Television Program "Cops," ENT.
WKLY., Aug. 19, 1994, at 32, available in 1994 WL 12769614 ("[T]he reality-TV boom... began in the late
1980's.").
7 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614. The Court also held that it is a violation for the police to bring along
third parties if their presence is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. See id.
8 See id.
526 U. S. 808 (1999) (per curiam).
10 See id. at 809. The Court cited only minimal facts of the case, including that "officers searched the
ranch and its outbuildings pursuant to the authority conferred by the search warrant. The CNN media crew..
. accompanied and observed the officers, and the media crew recorded the officers' conduct in executing the
warrant." Id. Because the Court cited few facts, additional details must be gathered from the appellate
decision. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 526 U.S.
808 (1999).
11 See Berger, 129 F.3d at 509 ("At all times during and immediately prior to the search, USFWS
Special Agent Joel Scrafford was wired with a hidden CNN microphone which was continuously transmitting
live audio to the CNN technical crew.") Agent Scrafford wore the microphone inside the Berger home
without their permission to do so. See id.
12 See Editor, Our Opinion Court Protects Home From Media, YORK DALY RECoRD, May 27,
[Vol. 102:891
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need not mean the death of news coverage of the police in areas traditionally open
to the press' 3 for several reasons. First, the police have an interest in letting the
public know of efforts to fight crime,14 and an effective way to accomplish that
goal is through press coverage.15 Indeed, the press plays an important role in
keeping the public informed of police actions,16 and can not let Wilson or Hanlon
curtail its zealousness. Additionally, although the press does not have absolute First
Amendment protection in gathering news17 and can face civil or criminal liability if
certain boundaries are crossed,' 8 if the police try to stifle press coverage, significant
First Amendment issues are raised.' 9 Thus, the police should not overreact to the
rulings so as to end all media ride-alongs.20 This Note will discuss these issues in
light of the Wilson and Hanlon decisions.
Part II of this Note will give a statement of the Wilson and Hanlon cases,
including factual differences. Part III will give the background leading up to these
decisions, including the split among the federal circuits on allowing press coverage
of the execution of a search warrant inside a home. Parts IV and V will analyze
1999, at A8, available in 1999 WL 7596876; see also Tony Mauro, Another Gray Area (Press Liability), THE
QuI, July 1, 1999, at 30, available in 1999 WL 14944609.
13 See, e.g., Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976) (holding that the media was
not liable for trespass into a private home after a fire to take pictures because there is an implied consent by
the custom, usage and practice of traditional media access to scenes of recent emergencies and disasters and
because the fire marshal and a police officer requested media to take pictures). See also Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603,616 (1999).
14 See Kevin E. Lunday, Note, Permitting Media Participation in Federal Searches: Exploring the
Consequences for the United States Following Ayeni v. Mpttola and a Framework for Analysis, 65 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 278, 281 & n.20 (1997) (quoting Jane Hall, Judge Says, "Reality" TV Can't Join Raids, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1992, at F1 ("Martin Grabus, a First Amendment lawyer, commented on the implications of
Ayeni... : 'Government agencies don't like to say no [to media requests to accompany searches] because it
looks bad, and they don't want to appear to be secretive.')).
15 See David E. Bond, Note, Police Liability for the Media "Ride-Along," 77 B.U. L. REv. 825,926
n.7 (1997) (quoting W. CLINTON TERRY, CRIME AND THE NEws: GATEKEEPING AND BEYOND, IN JUSTICE
AND THE MEDIA 41-42 (Ray Surette ed., 1984) ("[P]olice departments have a vested interest in promoting
their public image; consequently they are often selective in what they report to the media. In particular, they
report those types of criminal activities with which they have had the most success, that underscores the
seriousness of the crime problem, and that demonstrates a social need for their services ....")).
16 See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that the
public gets most of its information about police actions from the press); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975) (holding that informing the general public about the administration of criminal justice is an
important role of the press).
17 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding that reporters have no right to
photograph prisoners without government permission); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding
that reporters must give testimony to grand jury in a criminal case); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103
(1937) (holding that the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the laws).
18 See generally Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the First
Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during
the course of news gathering).
19 The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. L
20 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
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Wilson and Hanlon and how the United States Supreme Court reconciled the
inconsistencies among the circuits. Finally, Part VI will identify possible
implications of Wilson and Hanlon and identify gaps in the rulings and give
guidance to the press and the police.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASES
A. Wilson v. Layne
In early 1992, the U.S. Attorney General's Office decided to step up its
effort to bring in "dangerous" fugitives from justice in a program called
"Operation Gunsmoke. '' 21 The operation focused on arresting armed individuals
wanted on state, local, or federal drug charges and violent felonies.2 The U.S.
Marshal's Office hoped to get this job done and gain positive media exposure by
letting the public know of its work.23 A reporter and photographer from the
Washington Post rode along with one team of officers for two weeks. 24 This ride-
along was approved by the agent in charge of Operation Gunsmoke, Harry Layne, 2
pursuant to a U.S. Marshal's policy manual provision that allowed media ride-
alongs.26
On April 16, 1992, at 6:45 a.m., the marshals and Montgomery County,
Maryland, police officers followed by a reporter and photographer for the Post,
entered the home of Charles and Geraldine Wilson looking for the Wilson's son,
Dominic. 27 The officers knocked on the door and the Wilsons' nine-year-old
granddaughter, at her grandparents' home waiting for the school bus, let them in.
28
The Wilsons were still in bed, but when Charles Wilson heard the noise from the
officers' entrance into the house, he ran into the living room wearing only his
underwear.29 Mr. Wilson saw at least five men in street clothes with guns; he
wanted to know why they were there, and he repeatedly cursed at them.30 The
officers believed he was the man for whom they were searching and forced him to
21 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 626 app. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24 See Brief for Petitioners at 2, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 98-83), available in
1998 WL 901778.
25 See Brief for Respondents at 3, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 98-83), available in
1999 WL 38592.
26 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607.
27 See id.
28 See Respondents' Brief at 3, Wilson (No. 98-83); see also Petitioners' Brief at 3, Wilson (No. 98-
83).
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the floor, placing a gun to his head.3' Mrs. Wilson came into the room, dressed in a
sheer nightgown, and saw the officers restraining her husband.
32
During the search, the Washington Post photographer took pictures, and
the reporter, while in the living room, observed the police take-down of Mr. Wilson
and Mrs. Wilson's reaction to it.' The officers learned that the man they had
subdued was not the man they wanted.34 In fact, Dominic Wilson, the subject of the
warrant, was not in the home at allas and did not live there.36 The pictures taken that
night by the Washington Post were never published,37 and no mention was made of
the Wilsons in the subsequent Post story about the success of Operation
Gunsmoke.as The Wilsons later sued the federal and state law enforcement officers
for bringing the media into their home during the search.39
B. Hanlon v. Berger
In March of 1993, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
obtained a search warrant for Paul W. Berger's 75,000 acre ranch, including
"appurtenant structures, excluding the residence." 40 Federal agents hoped to find
evidence of "the taking of wildlife in violation of the law,",41 specifically that Mr.
Berger was poisoning eagles.42
Unlike Wilson, in Hanlon members of the media from CNN entered into
an agreement with an Assistant United States Attorney.4' This contract allowed
CNN to accompany the Fish and Wildlife Service agents as they executed the
31 See Petitioners' Brief at 5, Wilson (No. 98-83).
32 See id.
33 See id. at 4-5.
34 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607.
35 See id.
36 See Petitioners' Brief at 3, Wilson (No. 98-83). But see Brief for Respondents at 2, Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 98-83), available in 1999 WL 38593 (stating that Dominic Wilson had
listed the address the police entered as his own on several occasions).
37 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608.
38 See Respondents' Brief at 4, Wilson (No. 98-83); see also Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606 (stating that the
program was effective, resulting in more than 3,000 arrests in 40 metropolitan areas).
39 Plaintiffs may bring suit for damages against federal officers under the doctrine advanced in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). State or local police officers can be
sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
40 Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 809 (1999) (per curiam).
41 Id. at 809.
42 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 526 U.S.
808 (1999) (the Supreme Court opinion recited few facts in its holding, so details must be gathered from
Berger).
4 See Berger, 129 F.3d at 508.
2000]
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search warrant on Mr. Berger's ranch in Jordan, Montana. 44 The contract gave
CNN complete editorial control over any footage shot, did not obligate the use of
the video footage, and did not waive any rights or privileges CNN had with respect
to the footage.45 In exchange, CNN agreed not to air the footage until after a
determination of Mr. Berger's guilt or innocence.46 The search warrant was issued
by a magistrate who had no knowledge of this contract.47 The warrant contained no
language allowing the videotaping of the search.48
On the morning of the search a pre-search briefing was held, CNN was
there and shot videotape of the meeting.49 CNN also mounted a small camera on
the hood of one of the government vehicles, facing into the vehicle.,50 The lead
agent, USFWS Special Agent Joel Scrafford, was wired with a hidden microphone
which continuously transmitted live audio to the CNN technical crew.5 ' The
broadcast team, in private vehicles, then proceeded with federal agents in a caravan
of about ten government vehicles to a point just outside the Berger ranch.52 Mr.
Berger drove his truck to meet the caravan. 3 He agreed to allow Agent Scrafford to
ride with him back to his home to explain the search.54 Mr. Berger agreed to allow
Agent Scrafford into his home, but at no time did Agent Scrafford inform the
Bergers that he was wearing a live microphone or that the cameras, visible outside
the home, belonged to CNN. 5 It is disputed as to whether agents who entered the
home searched it for incriminating evidence. 6 However, it is undisputed that all
conversations with the Bergers, inside their home, were recorded.
5 7
The agents were able to execute the warrant and throughout the course of
the day agents searched the ranch and its outbuildings while the media crew





47 See id. at 508-09.
48 See Berger, 129 F.3d at 509.
See id.
50 See Brief for Respondents at 2, Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999) (No. 97-1927), available in
1998 WL 901783.
51 See Berger, 129 F.3d at 509.
52 See Respondents' Brief at 4, Hanlon (No. 97-1927).
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no time did CNN help in the search.59
Mr. Berger was convicted of applying pesticide to sheep carcasses with
the intent to kill predators, including eagles. 0 He was acquitted of other charges.6 '
Nearly two months after Mr. Berger's conviction, CNN aired part of the footage. 2
Part HI explains how the cases reached the U. S. Supreme Court.
I. BACKGROUND: WHY Now?
For decades the media has been invited by the police to take pictures of
police events.63 In the late 1920's and early 1930's, Elliott Ness, a United States
prohibition agent, used the media to get a psychological edge over his nemesis, Al
Capone.6 Ness often tipped off the press so photographers could be there to take
pictures when he busted up Capone's breweries.65 More daring media ride-alongs,
where the press actually rode in the car with the police, came into vogue in the late
1980's. 66 It was not until the early and mid-1990's that the federal circuit courts
began to hear appeals of cases involving Fourth Amendment violations by the
police when the media rode along with them and entered private homes.67 The
circuits were split on the effect of media presence on Fourth Amendment rights.
The Second and Ninth Circuits held that media presence during a search violated
the Fourth Amendment.8 The Eighth and Fourth Circuits found that it did not
59 See Brief for Respondents at5, Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999) (No. 97-1927), available in
1998 WL 901783.
60 See id. at 5-6.
61 See id. at 6.
62 See id,
63 See Lyle Denniston, The End of the Road? Advocates for Media Ride-Alongs During Police
Operations Found a Disdainful Audience at the Supreme Court, AM. LAW., May 1999, at 57, available in
1999 WL AMLAW 57.
6 See Tom McNamee, Ness Legend Gets a Touch-Up, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 4, 1997, § 2, available
in 1997 WL 6367250.
65 See id.
6 See Svetkey, supra note 6, at 32; see also David Tobenkin, Real Stories of a Crowded Genre,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 22, 1995, at 16, available in 1995 WL 7938985 (listing the mid-90's
syndicated "ride-along" programs, including Cops, Real Stories of the Highway Patrol, Top Cops, Rescue
911, Emergency Call, Juvenile Justice, Citizen's Arrest, and L.A.P.D.).
6 See Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, Law Enforcement Theatricals: Privacy in Peril'
522 PLI/PAT 45 (1998). Lawsuits were filed earlier, and some settled for millions. See Bond, supra note 15,
at 827 n.8 (citing Geraldo Settles $30- Million Suit by Woman Filmed in TV Raid, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1990,
at A12 (reporting the settlement of a libel suit arising out of Geraldo Rivera's American Vice: The Doping of
a Nation)). Geraldo Rivera's two-hour television special, American Vice, first aired in December 1986; it was
one of the first televised ride-alongs. See Bond, supra note 15, at 872.
68 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was
violated and that officers did not have qualified immunity) affid in part and rev'd in part, 526 U.S. 808
(1999), (holding that the Fourth Amendment was violated, but that officers did have qualified immunity);
Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1062 (1995) (holding that "an
2000]
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violate the Fourth Amendment.69 The circuits reached their conclusions based on
different analyses. The Second Circuit ruled in Ayeni v. Mottola,7 0 and the Ninth
Circuit followed in Berger v. Hanlon,71 that the presence of media during the
execution of a search warrant was prohibited under the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness clause.7 2 The Second and Ninth Circuits also agreed that because a
"clearly established" right had been violated by the officers, they were not entitled
to qualified immunity. 73 The Eighth Circuit, in Parker v. Boyer,74 agreed that there
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but ruled that no "clearly established"
right existed,75 and therefore, agents were entitled to qualified immunity in a
Section 1983 suit.
76
The Fourth Circuit, in Wilson v. Layne,77 ruled that not enough authority
existed to find that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they brought
the press inside a home. 78 The facts of Ayeni and Parker are similar to the facts of
Wilson - in each case members of the media were either invited by the police or
allowed by the police to come into the home. 9 In Berger, members of the press did
not come inside the home, but a microphone, for the purposes of recording
conversation, was attached to a federal agent who did go inside the house. 0 The
objectively reasonable officer could not have concluded that inviting a television crew - or any third party not
providing assistance to law enforcement - to participate in a search was in accordance with Fourth
Amendment requirements").
69 See Wilson v. Layne, 110 F.3d 1071 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that authorities had qualified
immunity, pursuant to a department policy, to bring along a reporter and photographer into a private home),
rev'd, 526 U. S. 603 (1999); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997)
(holding that officers had immunity in permitting a television crew to be inside a house during a search,
because there was no "clearly established constitutional principle" offended by the officer's conduct).
70 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
71 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
72 See id. at 510-11 (holding also that the warrant was obtained under false pretenses because law
enforcement failed to inform the magistrate that a written contract had been entered into with CNN); Ayeni,
35 F.3d at 686 (holding that the unreasonableness of the agent's conduct in bringing the television crew was
heightened by the fact that the crew served no legitimate need of law enforcement and the act was calculated
to inflict injury on the very value that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect, that of privacy).
73 See Berger, 129 F.3d at 512; Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686-87. The right that was "clearly established" in
both cases was the right against unreasonable searches. See Berger, 129 F.3d at 512; Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686-
87.
74 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997).
75 See id. at 448 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring specially) (finding that the first step in qualified
immunity analysis must be a determination of whether the claimed constitutional right exists).
76 See id. at 447.
77 110 F.3d 1071 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
78 See id. at 1075 (ruling that the lack of Supreme Court direction on the question allowed for a
finding of no Fourth Amendment violation).
79 See Parker, 93 F.3d at 446-47; Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1994).
80 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 1997) (cameras were outside the home
8
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warrant in Berger excluded the home, but it was disputed as to whether any search
for evidence was done inside the home.8' The larger issue for the Ninth Circuit in
Berger was that law enforcement and the media (CNN) jointly planned this search
and had even entered into a written contract, none of which was disclosed to the
magistrate issuing the warrant.82
With such a split among the circuits, the time was ripe for the United
States Supreme Court to take up the issue of media-ride alongs; the Court therefore
granted certiorari in Wilson v. Laynea and Hanlon v. Berger.84
IV. ANALYSIS OF WILSON: UNWELCOME VISITORS
The events in Wilson happened long before any circuits, as discussed in
Part m, made their rulings.85 The line of reasoning from those circuit decisions was
varied, so the United States Supreme Court in Wilson set out to clarify the analysis
to be used to address qualified immunity88 and to state a rule for what constitutes a
Fourth Amendment violation concerning press presence in the home during a
police search.87 The Court engaged in a two-step analysis: (1) determining if a
constitutional right was violated and then (2) addressing the qualified immunity
question.'
A. Constitutional Violation
The Court relied heavily on the "a man's home is his castle" language
from English casqs and commentaries 89 to assert that "[t]he Fourth Amendment
embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home."9" The
Court then relied on its own rulings that the Fourth Amendment exists to protect
citizens from police entry into the home9' without a valid warrant or without
recording the sound from the agent's microphone).
81 See id.
82 See id. at 510-11 (holding that non-disclosure meant the warrant was obtained under false
pretenses).
83 526 U. S. 603 (1999).
84 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
85 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607 (the Wilson's home was searched April 1992).
86 See id. at 609.
87 See id. at 614 (holding that it is a "violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring
members of the media.., into a home during the execution of a warrant").
88 See id. at 609.
89 See i& at 609-10 (citing Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604); WILLAM BLACKSTONE,
4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223 (1765-69)).
90 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610.
91 See id. (citing United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)
2000]
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exigent circumstances.92 Although the police had a valid warrant, the Court
reasoned that the presence of the reporter and photographer nevertheless exceeded
the terms of the search warrant.93 The Court did acknowledge that not every police
action while inside a home need be "explicitly authorized by the text of the
warrant.",94 Officers may take such further actions as are reasonably related to
accomplishing the search authorized by the warrant or that accomplish additional
legitimate law enforcement objectives.9 5 The Wilson Court further determined that
the Fourth Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a warrant be
"related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. 96
The respondents conceded "that the reporters did not engage in the
execution of the warrant.", 97 The Court found that the reporters were not there to
identify property, a common-law exception to third party presence in a police
search.98 The respondents claimed that the media's presence did serve a legitimate
law enforcement purpose, to let the public know about crime-fighting measures;
and that officers should have discretion to bring along the press.99 The Court
dismissed that argument, ruling that if officers had unlimited discretion to find
when it would further some general law enforcement mission to bring along the
press, it would water down the core of residential privacy within the Fourth
Amendment's text.100
Next, respondents argued a First Amendment right, stating that the press's
presence "publicize[d] the government's efforts to combat crime, and facilitate[d]
accurate reporting on law enforcement activities."1' 1 The Court agreed that past
rulings held that the press has certain First Amendment rights to inform "the
(finding that "[pihysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed")).
92 See id. at 610-11 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602, 603-604 (1980) (ruling that
absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, police could not enter a home to make an arrest, but a warrant
"founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the
suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within")).
93 See id. at 611 (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990)).
94 Id. (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)).
95 See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (detaining occupants while search is in
progress); United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1982) (limited search of individual on premises as
self-protective measure).
96 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison,
480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) ("[T]he purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent of the
search.")).
Id.
98 See id. at 612 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (K.B. 1765) (holding that a
third party may help in the search of stolen goods, but he "must swear that the goods are lodged in such a
place. He must attend at the execution of the warrant to show them to the officer, who must see that they
answer the description") (quoted with approval in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)).
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612.
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general public about the administration of criminal justice" and that the public
relies on the press for such information. 102 However, the Court concluded that First
Amendment intrusion would be limited if the press was barred from the home, but
if allowed to come in privacy concerns of those inside would be great.103 In other
words, the Fourth Amendment privacy rights far outweigh the First Amendment
right to get the story, and it was in that light that the media ride-along was
judged.14 The Court also rejected an argument that media presence would cut
down on police abuse or protect suspects or officers; the media was working on the
story for its own purposes, not on behalf of the police and certainly not on behalf of
the Wilsons. °5
The Court also stated that the First Amendment was not violated because
the press could still cover the story without going inside the home. 06 The Court
concluded that press presence inside the home was not warranted, for police
purposes,'07 and by inviting the press into the home the police had violated the
Fourth Amendment rights of those inside.
l08
B. Qualified Immunity
Once the Court found a violation of a constitutional right, it moved to the
question of qualified immunity to determine whether that right was "clearly
established" at the time of the offense.109 The Court held that "clearly established,"
for purposes of qualified immunity, means that "the right allegedly violated must
be defined at the appropriate level of specificity."" 0 Thus, the question here was
would reasonable officers know or should they have known that bringing the press
102 See id. at 612-13 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,572-73 (1980)).
103 See id. at 613.
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107 See Wilson at 610.
108 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614 n.2 (ruling that "[e]ven though such actions might violate the Fourth
Amendment, if the police are lawfully present, the violation of the Fourth Amendment is the presence of the
media and not the presence of the police in the home").
109 Plaintiffs may sue state or local police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while federal officers can
be sued under the doctrine advanced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. The qualified immunity analysis is identical in suits under § 1983 and Bivens.
See id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 n.9 (1989); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2
(1986)). "[G]ovemment officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified
immunity and are 'shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' Id. (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
110 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).
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inside a home, while executing a warrant, was a constitutional violation?11' The
Court asserted that the constitutional question presented in this case was "by no
means open and shut."
112
The Court then examined the body of law on point and found only one
decision from a state intermediate level court. 113 That case found that media
presence inside the home was reasonable. 14 On the federal level, only two
unpublished opinions were found; 1 5 both upheld a search with the media
present. 16 The Court then looked at cases that involved third-party presence in
general and found one case that the Sixth Circuit had ruled on five weeks prior to
the events of Wilson.' 17 In Bills v. Aseltine,"8 the Sixth Circuit found that police
may not bring along a third party inside a home with a warrant when that third
party's purpose is unrelated to the purposes of the warrant." 9
Finally, the Court looked at the reliance of the officers, both United States
marshals and Montgomery County deputies, on their own media ride-along
programs. 120 The Marshals Service policy "explicitly contemplated that media who
engaged in ride-alongs might enter private homes with their cameras as part of
fugitive apprehension arrests.' 2' The Montgomery County Sheriff Department's
See id.
112 Id. The Court seems to be arguing with itself on the constitutional question, stating "[accurate
media coverage of police activities serves an important public purpose, and it is not obvious from the general
principles of the Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in this case violated the Amendment."
Id. at 615-16.
113 See id. at 616. "The only published decision directly on point was a state intermediate court
decision which, though it did not engage in an extensive Fourth Amendment analysis, nonetheless held that
such conduct was not unreasonable." Id. (citing Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980)).
114 See id.
115 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616 (citing Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620 (N.D. Ohio
1984); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. 2371 (S.D. Cal. 1980)). These cases dealt with media
entry into homes and both "upheld the search on unorthodox non-Fourth Amendment right to privacy
theories." Id.
116 See id. (finding that these cases "can not 'clearly establish' that media entry into homes during a
police ride-along violates the Fourth Amendment").
117 See id. (citing Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that there were
material issues of fact precluding summary judgment on the question of whether police exceeded the scope of
a search warrant by allowing a private security guard to participate in the search to identify stolen property
other than that described in the warrant)).
118 958 F.2d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 1992).
119 See id. at 706, cited in Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617. The Wilson Court stated this was still not enough
information to give the officers notice of a constitutional violation of media presence inside the home when
executing a warrant. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617.
120 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617.
121 Id. at n.4 (citing UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE POLICY MANUAL App. 4-5 (stating that
"fugitive apprehension cases ... normally offer the best possibilities for ride-alongs")).
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ride-along program "did not expressly prohibit media entry into private homes.""2
The Court concluded that because the state of the law was undeveloped
and because the officers' own departments' ride-along programs encouraged media
presence, it was reasonable for officers to believe that bringing the media inside a
home was not a constitutional violation.'
23
Therefore, although the Court found a Fourth Amendment violation, it did
not find the Wilson defendants liable for civil damages because there was no
"clearly established" rule at the time of the search. 24 Police were bringing along
the press to try to bolster their public image.' 23 This ruling now means bringing
along the press carries a burden. It could cost the police damages. The police now
have a black-and-white rule that tells them when they bring the press inside the
home it will be an invasion of the privacy of the people inside.
26
V. ANALYSIS OF HANLON: WHAT DOES BEING IN THE HOME MEAN?
The Court in Hanlon issued a short, per curiam opinion with little
analysis. 27 In the two-page opinion, the Court restated its position from Wilson that
"police violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners when they allow
members of the media to accompany them during the execution of a warrant in
their home."'128 This brief opinion leaves open questions about what is meant by
"in the home," because the press were not present in the home and the home was
not subject to search pursuant to the warrant.'29 However, the original Ninth Circuit
case of Berger v. Hanlon130 held that "[t]he television cameras invaded the
residential property of the plaintiffs and the microphone invaded their home.'
131
The Ninth Circuit held in Berger that there was evidence that the outbuildings on
the ranch were places where the Bergers had a "reasonable expectation of privacy,
in that they were located close to the house and guarded by a dog."
' 132
122 Iak at 617 (quoting from Deposition of Sheriff Raymond M. Kight at 8, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603 (1999) (No. PJM-94-1718)).
123 See id. at 618 (Stevens, J., dissenting on the "clearly established" issue).
124 See i&
125 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 626 ("Media 'ride-alongs' are one effective method to promote an
accurate picture of Deputy Marshals at work.").
126 See id. at 614.
127 See Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999) (per curiam). Because the Court cited few facts of the
case, additional details must be gathered from the appellate opinion. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th
Cir. 1997).
128 Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810.
129 See Berger, 129 F.3d at 508.
130 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
131 Id. at 510.
132 Id. at 512-13. An expectation of privacy in curtilage "should be resolved with particular reference
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A federal agent was wearing a microphone and all conversations with the
Bergers, both outside and inside their home, were recorded.as The Bergers did not
give permission to record the conversations and were not informed of such
recording.' 34 The district court in Berger also found that the presence of the
microphone, attached to Agent Scrafford, to be a violation of the Bergers'
constitutional rights, because the recording was not done for legitimate law
enforcement reasons, but used to assist commercial television. 1
Wilson is very clear about which right is being protected from the police.
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Fourth Amendment right being protected,
when the media are present with the police, is the right of privacy "inside the
home." 136 However, Berger stands for the proposition that curtilage 137 can also be
an area where the expectation of privacy is high and therefore it is not just "inside
that home" that is protected, but also the area close to the home that falls under
these same privacy protections.138 Curtilage is hard to define, but the Court has long
relied on Justice Harlan's two-pronged test developed in Katz v. United States: 39
first, a person must have a subjective expectation of privacy and, second, society
must be willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. 140 Curtilage is defined
to the following four factors... (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the area is within an
enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature and uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by
the resident to protect the area from observation by passersby." United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 294-95
(1987).
133 See Berger, 129 F.3d at 509.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 513 (the invited informer doctrine does not shield the media from liability). See also
United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the invited informer doctrine justifies the
use of undercover agents and informers, as long as their use is part of a good faith government investigation);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that eavesdropping by the media for public
broadcast, even in conjunction with law enforcement, violates important privacy interests).
136 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999).
137 Black's Law Dictionary defines curtilage as "any land or building immediately adjacent to a
dwelling, and usually it is enclosed some way by a fence or shrubs. For search and seizure purposes, includes
those outbuildings which are directly and intimately connected with the habitation and in proximity thereto
and the land or grounds surrounding the dwelling which are necessary and convenient and habitually used for
family purposes and carrying on domestic employment." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990).
138 Determining where curtilage begins and ends is not black and white. See Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (ruling that a marijuana patch a mile away from the defendant's home was subject
to the "open field" doctrine and not curtilage, and that the only area subject to legitimate privacy concerns
was the area immediately surrounding the home); see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)
(holding that a barn fifty yards from the house was not being used for intimate activities associated with the
home, and little was done to protect the barn from observation); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)
(holding that the entrance to the home was not protected by the Fourth Amendment because it was clearly
visible from the street and there was no expectation of privacy).
139 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
140 See id. at 361. The Court relied on the Harlan reasonableness test in Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170 (1984) (holding that an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the
home will remain private). Cf Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (holding that an
aerial view of the area surrounding the Dow plant was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that a fenced-in backyard met the first prong of the Katz test, but not
14
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on a case-by-case basis, and many commentators believe it is little more than a
"buzzword."
1 41
The easiest way for a lay person to understand curtilage is to tell them it is
the area of private property "immediately adjacent to the home,"'142 but what is
"immediate" depends on the four factors from Dunn.'4 Therefore, because
determining what is curtilage is so tough it seems likely the police will not invite
the media onto private property while a warrant is being executed.
VI. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF WILSON AND HANLON?
The press is not allowed inside the home or on the protected curtilage, if
invited there by the police, when a warrant is being served.144 However, it could be
argued if the members of the press do not ride along, but show up on their own and
initiate coverage, no Fourth Amendment violation occurs. The Fourth
Amendment145 protects the rights of private citizens to be free from unreasonable
intrusions by government officials when the individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 46 However, it may be difficult to gain access to the inside
of a home or protected curtilage when the police are on the premises to conduct a
search.'47 Because of the ruling in Wilson, police are on notice when executing a
search, with or without a warrant, that an invitation to the press will trigger a
Fourth Amendment violation. 48
the second prong). The Ciraolo Court held that the area was curtilage, but society was not prepared to
recognize the privacy interest; anyone looking down from an airplane could observe the marijuana plants. See
id. at 211.
141 See, e.g., Robert F. Livergood, California v. Ciraolo: Blanketing the Curtilage, 32 ST. Louis U.
LJ. 247, 261 (1987) (writing that "[p]rivacy will be defended only for those who jealously protect a
particular area from intrusion by blanketing the curtilage and its boundaries").
142 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
143 See supra note 132.
144 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999); Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 810 (1999) (per
curiam).
145 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
146 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967).
147 Many police departments have policies against allowing civilians to watch a search. See, e.g.,
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 624 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 41, Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 98-83), available in 1998 WL 901778 ("mhe Sheriff of Montgomery County, the
commanding officer of three of the respondents: 'We would never let a civilian into a home .... That's just
not allowed."')).
148 See id. at 614 (ruling "that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members
of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the
2000]
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A. Is There an Opening?
In covering news, reporters listen to police scanners and hear radio traffic
that indicate when a newsworthy event might be unfolding.1 49 In Prahl v.
Brosamle,1" ° police stormed a biochemist's home and laboratory after a standoff.
151
They had no warrant, but they did have probable cause.152 A television reporter
arrived on the scene after monitoring the events on a police scanner.5 3 The
reporter, Brosamle, was told by police that he "could come forward when the
situation was under control."1M4 Brosamle rode to the home with a police officer
and did come forward into Prahl's home.' The reporter, Brosamle, filmed the
officers as they confiscated guns and interviewed Prahl. 156 Prahl saw the reporter,
but thought that he was an officer or a deputy, and did not tell him to stop or
leave.15 7 The facts of Prahl are similar to Wilson in that Brosamle was invited into
the home by police and not the home owner15 8 and is a situation where the police
did not have a warrant.15 9 Therefore, it stands to reason that warrant or not, if the
police invite the media inside, there is a Fourth Amendment violation. 160
third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant" (emphasis added)); see also Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that absent exigent circumstances, no home may be entered
without a warrant). But see U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (holding that no warrant was needed when
suspect sought refuge in a home when she saw the police coming); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that there are exceptional circumstances for assessing when an arrest can be made
in the home without a warrant: 1) that a grave offense is involved, particularly one that is a crime of violence;
2) that the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; 3) that there exists not merely the minimum of
probable cause, that is requisite even when a warrant has been issued, but beyond that a clear showing of
probable cause, including "reasonably trustworthy information," to believe that the suspect committed the
crime involved; 4)that there exists a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered;
5) that there is a likelihood the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and 6) that the circumstance
that the entry, though not consented, is made peaceably); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding
that no warrant is required to enter a home if the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect).
149 See Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
150 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
151 See id. at 773.
152 See id. at 772-73.
153 See id at 773.
Id.




159 See id. at 772.
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999).
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss4/7
WILSON v. LAYNE
1. Custom and Usage
What the media has done in the past may no longer hold up after Wilson.
Across the country it has been a "longstanding custom and practice . . . for
representatives of the news media to enter upon private property where disaster of
great public interest has occurred., 161 In Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher,16 2 the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that it was not trespass for the media, without
permission from the home owner, to come inside a burned out home to photograph
the spot where a person died.'63 Florida Publishing did not deal with police action
or forced entry into a home in connection with the execution of a warrant, and
Justice Stevens distinguished it as such in Wilson.' But such an entry, not in aid of
the search, after a fire, may intrude on an individual's right to privacy and therefore
may trigger a Fourth Amendment violation.
Entering a building or home to fight a fire and searching for evidence after
the fire are distinguishable. 65 The emergency nature of a fire does not require
firefighters to obtain a warrant,166 and officials may even stay inside the burned out
structure "for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze."' 6 However,
a search for evidence sometime after the fire has been extinguished will require a
warrant.168 The question then becomes, during that "reasonable" time when no
warrant is needed, can the media be invited inside the burned out structure to take
pictures and video of the newsworthy event and not create a Fourth Amendment
violation for the firefighters or police?
161 Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1976) (holding that the media was not
liable for entering a private home after a fire to take photographs because of the custom, usage and practice of
media access to scenes of recent emergencies and disasters).
162 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
163 See id.
164 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 622 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority uses Florida Publ'g to
show the widespread practice of media accompanying officers into homes. I. at 616 n.3.
16 See, e.g., Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that firemen have a right to
enter a premises to fight a fire, to rescue trapped occupants, to ventilate the building after the fire has been
brought under control, to search for any smoldering fires and to clean up prior to departing all without
obtaining a warrant). The Steigler Court also held that any evidence of arson seen by the firemen in plain
view while performing their functions may be seized without first obtaining a warrant. See id.; see also
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (holding that a burning building clearly presents an exigency of
sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry "reasonable," as it would defy reason to suppose that
firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a burning structure to put out the blaze). The Tyler
Court also ruled that fire victims do have expectations of privacy in whatever remains of their property. See
id
166 See Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511 (holding that entry to fight a fire requires no warrant and officials may
remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze, but additional entries to investigate
the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches); see
also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Munic. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
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Because Wilson turned on protection of privacy and the Court has long
held that a privacy interest exists, even in burned out property, it seems press
presence would only be allowed, as in Fletcher,16 9 if its purpose was in aid of the
search or preserving evidence.
170
2. Duty to Keep the Press Out
This, in fact, raises the question of the duty of the police to keep the press
out during a lawful search. Police departments do have policies forbidding civilians
inside a home when a search is underway. 171 Wilson read broadly implies a duty for
police to refuse the press entry inside a home if a warrant or warrantless search is
underway, 172 unless the press presence is necessary to aid in the search.
B. Will Wilson Prevent the Press from Other Ride-Alongs?
It is not just the home that has high Fourth Amendment protection.
Commercial structures, that are not open to the public, are also afforded high
protection.'73 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Minnesota v.
Carter'74 that "[p]roperty used for commercial purposes is treated differently for
Fourth Amendment purposes ' 5 and quoted New York v. Burger 76 for the
proposition that "[a]n expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is
different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's
home."
177
Although a warrant is required most of the time for a commercial structure,
169 See Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 1976) (the fire investigator requested
that the newspaper photographer take a picture of the charred outline where the body was discovered, and the
photo was published by the newspaper the next day).
170 See id. It is likely no constitutional violation will occur when the press is present to aid in the
search. Cf Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (holding that it is a violation to bring third parties
when their presence is not in aid of the execution of the warrant).
171 See supra note 147; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (establishing a cause of action against federal employees who violate a citizen's individual civil
rights). A Bivens action can now be brought under Wilson against any government agent who invites the
media into a home during the execution of a search. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.
172 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.
173 See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313 (1921); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (criminal searches of
commercial property without a warrant held unreasonable); see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967) (holding that just like the home a warrant is required for an administrative search of commercial
premises which are not open to the public).
174 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
Id. at 90.
176 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
177 Id. at 700 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981)), quoted in Carter, 525 U.S. at
90.
18
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some warrantless searches are legal. Those include administrative searches of
businesses or industries that are pervasively regulated and have a long history of
regulation.1 78 Examples include the liquor and gun trades,179 which are subject to
"unannounced, even frequent, inspections. ' 0
Even if the expectation of privacy inside a business is not as high as the
expectation of privacy inside a home,' 8' it is not clear if the press can be invited by
government agents into an area of the business that does not allow public access,
without triggering Fourth Amendment violations.'8 2 Directly to that point, Justice
Rehnquist wrote in Wilson that it is the home and owner or inhabitant being
protected against the media intrusion.1 a
Although an office that does not allow public access may get the same
level of Fourth Amendment protection as a home, 84 the public access area of a
business may not.'15 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if the police are
searching an area of a business usually off limits to the public, with or without a
warrant, an invitation from an officer to allow the press inside would be a violation.
However, if the area of the business being searched, with or without a warrant, is
open to the public no violation would occur if the press is present.
C. Ride-Alongs on Routine Patrols
The media can still ride along with the police when they remain in public
places'88 or get permission to come onto the private property or into the home. The
178 See generally Marshall v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 611 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
179 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (holding that an exception to
the warrant requirement is given when dealing with the liquor industry which has a long history of
regulation); see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (holding that in certain situations
Congress can statutorily define a reasonable search, thereby waiving the warrant requirement).
180 Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
181 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (holding that the home is afforded the
highest degree of Fourth Amendment protection).
182 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (this is the only Supreme Court ruling on media
ride-alongs and it pertains only to the home). But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that
the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the general public); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (ruling that a publisher of a
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws).
183 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610.
184 See Michael Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches and Digital Contraband: The Fourth
Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE LJ. 1093 (1996) ("[T]he balancing standard developed in
Katz, Camara and Terry continued to provide the home and office with an exceptionally high level of
protection.").
185 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (the court distinguished an open field as
"usually ... accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office or a commercial structure
would not be"); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (plurality opinion) (the plurality
suggests that some government offices may have no expectation of privacy because they are "so open to
fellow employees or to the public").
186 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (holding the press has no special access to
19
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executive producer of the reality-based television show "COPS"'1 87 John Langley
said the decision in Wilson would not affect his program.
1 8
Although some police departments have suspended their ride-along
policies,189 others have not.' 90 Even if the media cannot ride along in the police car,
the media is entitled to venture anywhere that the public is allowed.1 91 The media
could observe car chases because they are on public highways and could watch
searches of vehicles because of the near non-existence of an expectation of
privacy.
192
D. Get it in Writing
The media may be allowed to follow police into a home if such permission
is granted in express terms in the warrant, but chances of getting that wording into
a warrant since Wilson may be difficult. In Stack v. Killian,193 a news reporter and
camera crew were present during the search of the plaintiffs business, an animal
shelter.' 94 The warrant obtained by the police authorized "videotaping and
photographing" during the execution of the search.'95 The warrant did not say the
local press could come along, but the court found that the express wording of the
warrant which stated that "videotaping and photographing" were permitted,
allowed the actions of the press.
1 96
information not available to the public).
187 This is a television show aired on the Fox Network featuring real-life footage of police in action.
See David Zurawik, High Court Ruling is Harsh Reality; TV: Producer of Fox's 'COPS' Says He's
Unconcerned, but Edict that Police Can Be Sued for Letting Media Tag Along Chills, Baffles the Industry,
BALTIMORE SUN, May 25, 1999, at lE, available in 1999 WL 5187472.
188 See id. (quoting Langley as saying, "we are unaffected by the decision because we obtain releases
from everyone involved in our program").
189 See Doug Halonen, High Court Shuts Door on Cameras, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, May 31, 1999, at 4,
available in 1999 WL 8766415 (stating that the FBI and the Washington Metropolitan Police Department
have scrapped fide-alongs).
190 See id. (stating that the Los Angeles Police Department has tightened its ride-along policy to
comply with the new ruling); see also Lawrence Messina, Ride-Alongs Long a Battle for Police Right v.
Wrong, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 27, 1999, at IC, available in 1999 WL 6728322 (reporting that just two
days after the Wilson decision, a television reporter was riding along with the police to track down suspects to
serve old arrest warrants).
191 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684.
192 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (holding that the police can do an inventory search
of a vehicle even after it is impounded at the police station); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
(holding that the interior of a vehicle can be searched as well as any containers found subject to an arrest); see
also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (holding that a motor home may be searched without a
warrant, because it is mobile and subject to extensive regulation and inspection).
193 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996).
194 See id. at 161.
See id. at 163.
196 See id.
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Such express language of "videotaping and photographing" seems rare. In
Ayeni v. Mottola,197 the warrant authorizing the search stated "James Mottola and
any Authorized Officer of the United States. ' 1 98 The warrant did not expressly say
anything about allowing a CBS camera crew to record sound and pictures. 199 The
Second Circuit ruled that there was no implied authorization because there was no
claim that the "presence of the CBS camera crew served any legitimate law
enforcement purpose., 200 Therefore, the Ayeni Court ruled that the police were
wrong to bring in CBS cameras, stating "[a] private home is not a soundstage for
law enforcement theatricals." 20'
In Wilson, the Court noted that the police had a valid warrant to enter the
home to execute the arrest warrant, "but that does not necessarily follow that they
were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and photographer with them. '20 2 By
using the qualifying language of "not necessarily,, 20 3 the Court left open the
possibility that a warrant with express language allowing press presence might not
be a violation.
However, this ruling from Wilson that it is a violation for the police to
invite media into a home without a legitimate law enforcement purpose, has given
magistrates notice. Magistrates will have to make sure that the warrant is not
overbroad and that it is carefully tailored to its justifications. °4
E. Press Presence as a Necessary Action
It is possible that the police can invite the media inside a home while
executing a search warrant if the media's presence is related to the objectives of the
search. However, that justification might put the press and police at cross purposes.
The police could argue that press presence is needed to record or photograph some
destructible evidence.20 Courts have ruled on numerous occasions that third party
presence necessary for the execution of a warrant is permissible.
206
197 35 F,3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).




202 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999).
203 Id at611.
204 See Maryland v. Garrison, 408 U.S. 79 (1987) (ruling that the purposes justifying a police search
strictly limit its extent).
205 See Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 1976) (the fire marshal ran out of
film and asked a newspaper photographer to take a picture of the silhouette of the body; the picture was given
to officials for use in the investigation and published by the newspaper).
206 See 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994). That section provides:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its
2000]
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For instance, in Florida Publishing Co. v Fletcher,20 7 a Fire Marshal ran
out of film and the newspaper photographer was asked to come inside and take a
picture which became a part of the official investigation file.208 The photographer
was not prohibited from using the pictures for the newspaper's own purposes and
the pictures appeared in the newspaper the next day.20 9
A hypothetical situation will demonstrate this theory. Assume that the Los
Angeles Police plan to execute a search, with an authorized warrant, of Rodney
King's home. The problems the police had when they arrested King on a public
highway have been well documented,210 so they want to bring along a neutral
observer to record all events. Would the police be justified in requesting a
magistrate to authorize in the warrant the presence of one media photographer and
would the magistrate be authorized in granting the warrant?21' The press presence
would be in aid of the search by recording the activities to protect the police and
Mr. King from unwarranted allegations.212
The media would give a copy of the videotape or still photos to the police
and still be allowed to use the video or pictures for news purposes. The police
would require the one photographer to "pool" the videotape or photographs; in
other words, the search footage or photographs would be available to all media
outlets.
The language of Wilson states the photographer was not present, in that
direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by no other
person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in its
execution.
Id.; see also United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486-87 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that a
telephone company employee can assist police in a search); In re Southeastern Equip. Co. Search Wan-ant,
746 F. Supp. 1563, 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (holding that a customs agent has the right to ask a defense
department investigator to assist in a search); United States v. Gambino, 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that a confidential informant may assist in a search); United States v. Schwimmer, 692 F.
Supp. 119, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a computer expert may assist in a search).
207 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
208 See id. at 916.
209 See id.
210 See Gregory Howard Williams, Controlling the Use of Non-Deadly Force: Policy and Practice,
10 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 79 (1993) (citing the REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991) [hereinafter LAPD REPORT] (the Commission found that there is a
significant number of LAPD officers who repetitively misuse force and persistently ignore the written
policies and guidelines of the Department regarding force)).
211 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule is used to
punish the police and not magistrates, if the officer has a "good faith" belief in the probable cause he has
presented to the magistrate the evidence will not be excluded); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614
n.2 (1999) (the Court had no occasion in this case to decide if the exclusionary rule would apply to any
evidence discovered or developed by the media representatives).
212 See Williams, supra note 210, at 104 n.14 (citing the LAPD REPORT, supra note 210, at 31-39
(extensively discussing how racist, sexist and ethnic biases within the LAPD contribute to the excessive use
of force against Los Angeles citizens)). As a result of the Commission's review of Mobile Digit Terminal
Transmissions, as well as a survey conducted by the LAPD, the Commission concluded that at least a quarter
of LAPD officers based their decisions to use force upon some degree of bias. See Williams, supra note 210,
at 104 n.14 (citing the LAPD REPORT, supra note 210, at 31-39).
[Vol. 102:891
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case, for any purpose but his own.213 In the above hypothetical the photographer
would be present to protect the safety of the police and the suspect and to reduce
the liability of the officers.
The Court also ruled in Wilson that gaining public relations from media
coverage is not the same as the media aiding in the execution of a warrant.214 In the
above scenario, although the videotape or photos might make the police look good
to the public, that is not the intended purpose for bringing the press inside. The
purpose is to provide a neutral observer for "quality control '215 and that could not
be accomplished by using one of LAPD'S own officers.
Even if this would be legally acceptable, this dual function of assisting the
investigation and covering the news could hurt the perception of press objectivity
and the public might view the news media, in the same light as the entertainment
media, as an agent of the police.216 If the photographer and her employer are
willing to take that professional risk and the police wanted to invite her along, it
could be argued, that under Wilson, it would be justified to do so and would be
considered in aid of the execution of the warrant.1 7
F. Media Avoidance of Color of Law
The news media's credibility is maintained if it is viewed as objective by
not taking sides.21 That is one reason the media wants to avoid being found to be
"joint actors" with government agents. The other reason is to avoid being sued for
213 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613.
214 See id. at 612.
215 This is the same term the Wilson Court uses, noting that police officers "themselves could
videotape home entries as part of a 'quality control' effort to ensure that the rights of homeowners are being
respected, or even to preserve evidence." Ld. at 613 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (noting
the use of a "mounted video camera" to record the details of a routine traffic stop)). Presumably, Rodney
King would not trust the police to record what happens inside his home when the police are executing a
warrant.
216 Even though the line is sometimes blurred, news programs are different from entertainment shows.
See David A. Logan, "Stunt Journalism," Professional Norms, and Public Mistrust of the Media, 9 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 151, 173 (1998) (calling for media self-regulation and the formation of a national "news
council" to bring stricter standards to journalism); see also Associated Press, Fox Television, Family Settle
Chase-Death Case, CHARLESTON GAzErr, Sept. 2, 1998, at PO8A, available in 1998 WL 5971214. The
West Virginia State Police changed its media ride-along policy after a high-speed chase killed a 21-year-old
woman. See id, A Real Stories of the Highway Patrol television cameraman was riding along with a trooper
that night. See id. The state police settled a lawsuit with the girl's family for $775,000. See id. The state
police spokesman at the time told the press: "[W]e will not have any of those reality-based programs in our
cruisers. They're not riding with us.... Those cameras are there purely for entertainment value." Id.; see
also WEST VIRGtnIA STATE POLICE RIDE-ALoNG PROGRAM PoLicY (definition of news media representative
specifically excludes employees of police documentary or re-enactment companies).
217 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (K.B.
1765) (in search for stolen goods case, "'[t]he owner must swear that the goods are lodged in such a place.
He must attend at the execution of the warrant to show them to the officer, who must see that they answer the
description"').
218 See Logan, supra note 216, at 170.
20001
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damages like the police now under Wilson . 219 The Ninth Circuit, in Berger v.
Hanlon220 ruled that members of the media were state actors working in
conjunction with federal agents . 2 1 The media defendant, CNN, appealed that
decision to the United States Supreme Court, but was denied certiorari. 22 Now the
suit against CNN can go forward on the issue of CNN reporters in the role of "joint
actors" with the government. 223 CNN may therefore be held liable for Fourth
Amendment violations. 224
This ruling can have at least two dangerous implications. First, it will be
harder for the media to defend against a constitutional tort, if found to be "joint
actors" with the government. And second, such a charge takes away the separation
between government and the media.
The Ninth Circuit is not the first court to rule that the media was acting in
concert with government agents while doing its job. The Second Circuit in Ayeni v.
Mottola2 2 5 as discussed supra in Part III, also ruled the media was acting in concert
with the police when they entered Mrs. Ayeni's home.226 The dissent in Parker v.
Boyer,22 ' from the Eighth Circuit, also discussed supra in Part Ill, agreed that the
media were "willful participants in joint activity with the State or its Agents. ,22
8
The best way for the media to avoid being ruled as "joint actors" is to
maintain independence and avoid being invited by police or government agents into
229areas of high privacy.
219 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618.
220 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
221 See id. at 515, 516.
222 See Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, Berger v. Cable News
Network, 525 U.S. 961 (1998).
223 See Berger, 188 F.3d at 1157.
224 See id. (summary judgment for CNN denied on issue of "joint actors" and CNN not entitled to
assert qualified immunity as a defense) (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992); Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d
1121,1128 (9th Cir. 1996)).
225 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
226 See Ayeni v. CBS, 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (no wording in the ruling called CBS "joint
actors" but the court held that CBS's photographing inside the home was a Fourth Amendment violation and
held that CBS could not be granted qualified immunity). After this ruling, CBS reached a confidential
settlement with the Ayenis. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 684 n.2 (2d Cir. 1994).
227 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997).
228 Id. at 449 (Arnold, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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G. Consent
Consent 30 from the homeowner or occupant is one of the media's best
tools for entering a home without risking liability. Police officers may also seek
consent to allow media presence during a search,23' but courts might rule that
would be coercion.232 Sometimes people just want to be photographed.2  For
instance, those being searched may want the protection a camera could provide.
They may be afraid of police abuse2m and feel media presence is in their best
interest.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court, in Wilson v. Layne,22 unanimously announced a new rule of
constitutional law.236 A rule that says police violate the Fourth Amendment when
230 Consent is defined as "voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and exercise of
sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice to do something proposed by another." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 210 (6th ed. 1990).
231 See Lunday, supra note 14, at 308 n.204 (writing that consent may be obtained by the police)
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-25 (1973) (requiring a standard of voluntariness to
determine whether consent was valid)). A search made by police after the subject of the search has freely and
intelligently given consent will validate a warrantless search. See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1982) (holding that the seizure of drugs pursuant to the defendant's valid consent did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
232 See Lunday, supra note 14 at 308 n.205 (claiming police can get into trouble for asking if the
media may come along):
If police coercion is present, a court may find that consent was not given freely and
voluntarily. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968). The issue of
whether duress or coercion was a factor in obtaining consent is determined by a totality
of the circumstances analysis. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557
(1980). Another Fourth Amendment issue is whether the person giving consent has the
authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding consent
to search valid where an officer reasonably believed that the person giving consent had
authority to do so, even if the person did not).
233 See Svetkey, supra note 6, at 32 (quoting Cops executive producer Bertram van Munster. "We
once taped a hooker performing oral sex on a man in a church parking lot.... Both of them gladly signed
releases. We couldn't use the footage, of course, but after that we knew we could get anyone to sign").
234 Several newspaper articles have extensively discussed the excessive use of police force. See, e.g.,
Patricia Hurtado, Feds: Cops Probe Progressing, NEWSDAY, Mar. 20, 1999, at A5, available in 1999 WL
8162893 (the investigation of the New York City Police Department at the alleged attack on Abner Louima);
Officer Suspended in Alleged Abuse, BATON ROUGE MORNING ADVOCATE, Apr. 10, 1999, at 3BX, available
in 1999 WL 6101738; Associated Press, Black Policeman Beaten: 5 White Officers Suspects, L.A. TES,
Dec. 16, 1992, at A26, available in 1992 WL 2826349; Courtland Milloy, A Call To End Siege Mentality
Among Police, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1992, at B1, available in 1992 WL 2155197; Michael H. Cottman,
Cops Antiblack, NEWSDAY, Oct. 14, 1992, at 31, available in 1992 WL 7560721 (three-year review of police
brutality hotline revealed majority of charges involved blacks complaining of abuse by white cops).
235 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
236 See id. at 614. Justice Stevens disagrees that it is a new rule of constitutional law. Stevens writes:
"Rather, it has refused to recognize an entirely unprecedented request for an exception to a well-established
principle. Police action in the execution of a warrant must be strictly limited to the objectives of the
25
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they bring the media with them into a home while executing a search when the
media's presence is neither consented to nor directly related to some specific law
237enforcement purpose. It is a narrow ruling. The issues raised by the different
facts in Hanlon make it difficult to know exactly what is meant by in the home and
the definition of curtilage is hard to nail down.
The journalism community is concerned that these rulings will mean a halt
to police cooperation in areas where the press is traditionally allowed.2  However,
the rulings do not outlaw all media ride-alongs nor should they stop the press from
vigorously pursuing information about police actions. Any police reliance on
Wilson or Hanlon for excluding the press from most aspects of investigative work
is an overreaction.
The press plays an important role in keeping the public informed about
police and government actions. 239 Likewise, police have an interest in keeping the
public informed of its work.240 Therefore, the rulings in Wilson v. Layne and
Hanlon v. Berger, although protecting an individual right to privacy in the home,
should not be viewed as a wall between the press and the police.
Kathy A. Brown
authorized intrusion." Id. at 619 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also dissents on the "clearly
established" issue in Hanlon. See Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 810 (1999) (per curiam) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
237 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.
238 See Zurawik, supra note 187, at lE (quoting Joe DeFeo, news director at WBFF and WNUV:
"It's getting increasingly hard to get information out of the police, and my fear is that this is another chance
for them to keep us out"); see also Mauro, supra note 12.
239 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978) (stating that "[w]e must not confuse the role
of the media with that of government; each has special, crucial functions, each complementing - and
sometimes conflicting with - the other").
240 See Lunday, supra note 14.
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